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Abstract: The participants of the electricity market 
concern very much the market price evolution. Various 
technologies have been developed for price forecast. 
SVM (Support Vector Machine) has shown its good 
performance in market price forecast. Two approaches for 
forming the market bidding strategies based on SVM are 
proposed. One is based on the price forecast accuracy, 
with which the being rejected risk is defined. The other 
takes into account the impact of the producer’s own bid. 
The risks associated with the bidding are controlled by 
the parameters setting. The proposed approaches have 
been tested on a numerical example.  
 
Keyword: electricity market, strategic bidding, price 
forecast, support vector machine  
 
I Introduction 
 
The electricity market is widely adopted in the world 
since its debut in Chile, 1982. With the electricity market, 
the price of the electricity is no more defined by the 
monopolist, which operates the power industry before the 
deregulation. The monopoly system breaks down into an 
oligopoly market. The players bid in the market following 
various strategies to maximize their utilities and therefore 
determine the market behaviors. Many literatures have 
studied the bidding strategies and their impacts to the 
market behaviors.  
Game theory is a useful tool to study the interactions 
between the players. The major feature of the game 
theory is that it takes into account the effect that the 
decision of one player will influence the decision of the 
others. It fits the context of the electricity market, hence 
has been widely applied for analyzing the behaviors of 
the market players [1][2].  
But game theory application needs a lot of detailed 
information about the market, while it is rather difficult to 
capture the exact situation of the market and other 
participants; especially a small changes even in the mind 
of one participant will possibly result in huge difference 
in market result, hence game theory is good for 
theoretically explaining an electricity market, providing a 
reasonable market behavior, but not for predicting the 
exact market outcome. The practical bidding strategy 
should be able to control the risk of the bidding; the 
‘equilibrium’ of the game in the electricity market is 
usually an isolated point, which is in some extent very 
arbitrary in terms of various information scenarios 
(perfect information is not realistic) and willingness of the 
market participants (e.g. maximize the market share or 
profit). In literature, the study on bidding strategy is 
concentrated on the theoretical analysis of the market 
behavior, but seldom on making the practical bidding 
strategy. 
The forecasted price is claimed to provide the references 
for the market bidding and has been intensively 
investigated with various technologies [3][4][5]. But there 
lacks of the study on how to make use of the forecast. In 
[3], the bidding strategy is simply to offer a price a little 
cheaper than the MCP (Market Clearing Price). It seems 
too rough and as it is indicated in [3], to apply this 
strategy, the player should be a market follower, namely 
what the player bid should not influence the market price. 
It is obviously not true in an oligopoly market. When the 
market players are making their bids, the impacts of their 
own biddings on the market price cannot be omitted.  
No matter with what kind of the bidding strategy, it is the 
major concern of the players to collect the useful market 
information, including the load information, the history 
prices and the information about their competitors’ 
generation costs and unit commitments, based on which, 
the optimal bidding strategies are defined.  
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is an excellent machine 
learning tool that is able to sensitively capture the 
evolution of the market price[6]. In this paper, we 
developed two bidding strategies, which are firmly 
grounded on a machine learning based price forecast or 
surplus forecast technology. With this strategy, the bidder 
is able to evaluate his currently status with respect to the 
market share concentration and chooses its optimal 
bidding prices considering the associated risks. Monte-
Carlo method is used to simulate the market context, 
which refers to the load evolution and the bidding of the 
other market participants.  
The remainder of the paper is composed by the following 
sections. In section II, the market clearing mechanism in 
the electricity market is briefly introduced; in section III, 
the price forecast based on SVM is explained and the 
bidding strategies based on price forecast and surplus 
forecast are presented in section IV; the proposed bidding 
strategy is tested by the numerical examples in section V 
and finally conclusions are drawn in section VI. 
 
II Electricity market modeling 
 
Before deregulation, the power system composed by 
generation, transmission and distribution systems is 
usually operated by a monopolist, which is strictly 
regulated by the authority. The adoption of the electricity 
market is to foster the competition so as to improve the 
efficiency. This competition is usually introduced to the 
power supply and demand side. Due to the technique 
reason, the transmission sector remains the system of 
monopoly and is required to be non discrimination, open 
access to accommodate a fair compete field to the market 
participants. There will be an independent system 
operator who manages the system operation following the 
market outcome with some necessary revision due to the 
technique constraints. The players of the electricity 
market can make their transactions through bilateral 
negotiation or bidding in the power exchange (PX). 
Therefore the price can be privately determined or 
defined by the bidding of the players. The former is not 
publicly declared; the latter is known by every one and 
will be a reference for the former. In literature the price 
forecast is for PX price and the study on bidding strategy 
is for PX transaction as well, although in reality most 
electricity is transacted by BT.  
The bids of the players can be a function representing the 
relation between the price and quantity (1 in Fig.1) or a 
pair of quantity and price (2 in Fig.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Bid with function    2.  Bid with quantity & price pair 
 
Fig. 1 market clearing in the electricity market 
 
III Price Forecast Technology with SVM 
 
The electricity price is the bidding result of the market 
participants. Since the players arbitrarily make their bid, 
some scholars even claim that the electricity price cannot 
be predicted [7]. The market players aim to maximize their 
utility, therefore game theory is suitable to predict the 
behavior of the market participants as well as the market 
results. But it is still hard to capture the players’ thought 
in reality, because the information is usually incomplete 
and sometimes the dominant player won’t fully excise the 
market power to avoid the strict regulation.  Time series 
and statistic methods are also very popular for predicting 
the market price, the major drawback is that the impact of 
the specific player’s behavior on the market price is hard 
to be incorporated into the time series model. Machine 
learning is a subfield of the artificial intelligence and is 
capable of dealing with the complexity problem. It 
includes the supervised learning and the unsupervised 
learning, the former has a definite correct result to follow 
and the latter hasn’t but to pursue a better result. Multi-
agent system is a kind of unsupervised learning theory, 
which is already used for making the bidding strategy [8]. 
SVM and ANN are the supervised learning approaches, 
which have been used for predicting the market price, but 
lack of the research on making the bidding strategy. In 
this paper, SVM is proposed for determining the bid 
strategy. 
Generally speaking, SVM is to minimize the structural 
risk instead of the usual empirical risk by minimizing an 
upper bound of the generalization error and obtains 
excellent generalization performance [9][12]. Moreover, 
SVM has already been used for classification [13][14], 
regression[15][16] and time series prediction [17][18]. SVM is 
well known for the small sampling problem and has 
shown excellent performance in predicting the electricity 
market price [6].  
SVM is to map the input data x into a higher 
dimensional feature space  through a nonlinear mapping 
Φ and then a linear regression problem is obtained and 
solved in this feature space. With the given training data 
{(x1,y1), … (xi,yi),… (xn,yn)}, the mapping function can be 
formulated as,  
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where ωi and b are the parameters need to be defined. ε-
SVR is to find a function f(x) that has at most ε deviation 
from the actually obtained targets yi for all the training 
data and at the same time is as flat as possible. Flatness in 
this case means to reduce the model complexity by 
minimizing ||ω||2, we can write this problem as an 
optimization problem: 
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which means we do not care about errors as long as they 
are less than ε , but will not accept any deviation larger 
than this. To be more realistic, one can add slack 
variables ξi, ξi* i=1,2,3…n, to cope with otherwise 
infeasible constraints of the optimization problem (2). 
Hence we arrive at the formulation stated in [11]: 
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where C is a positive constant (known as regularization 
parameter). The optimization formulation can be then 
transformed into a dual problem (Vapnik, 1998)[12] and 
the solution is expressed as 
*
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where αi,αi* are the dual variables with reference to 
constraints (3-1) and (3-2) and 0≤αi, αi* ≤C. the constant 
C is the trade off between the flatness of f and the amount 
up to which deviation larger than ε are tolerated. 
( , ) ( ) ( )i j i jK x x x x= Φ ⋅ Φ is the kernel function that 
performs
 
the non-linear mapping, which must satisfy the 
Mercer’s conditions. Those sample points that appear 
with non-zero coefficients in (4) are so called support 
vectors (SV). Kernel function can be Gaussian function, 
polynomial function, sigmoid function etc.; In our SVR 
model, we apply the Gaussian kernel as (5), the 
convenience of which has been demonstrated in[19][20]; 
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SVM makes the mapping between a series of input and 
the market price. The input should be able to characterize 
and account for the variation of the price. For instance, in 
Fig.2 the load value Lt, the day type T and the hour t are 
taken as the factors to drive the price. By SVM, the 
mapping function between these factors and the market 
price are identified. From the outsider point of view, it 
would be appropriate to forecast the market price. But for 
the market participants, their own bids should be 
considered as an important factor, since their bidding 
strategies are able to cause the price variation. 
 
 
Fig.2  Price forecast by SVM 
 
IV Bidding Strategies Based on Price 
Forecast and Surplus Forecast 
 
In electricity market, the producer’s minimum bidding 
price is its marginal cost. It is also its optimal choice 
under perfect competition, in which the market players 
are price-takers. Sometimes the offering quantity of a 
generator is divided into two parts; the first one is 
corresponding to the minimum power output, which 
cannot be switched off due to the technique reason. To 
ensure its being dispatched, zero price is offered. The 
second offer will be considered for strategic gaming. 
Since the first offer can be directly subtracted from the 
original load as the bilateral contract and for sake of 
simplicity, we will not consider the technique constraints 
such as the ramp rate limit of the switch on and off.  
We propose two SVM based models for the market 
players making their bidding strategies. In the first 
approach, the bid is defined considering the rejection risk 
with reference to the forecasted price. In the second 
approach, the player’s surplus function is formulated by 
SVM, its optimal bid is obtained by surplus maximization. 
A. Bidding with price forecast 
The market price at hour t can be represented by: 
 pt=ptF+εt (6) 
εt~N(μt, σt2) (7) 
where, pt is the actual price at the time t, ptF is the price 
output of the SVM forecast for point t, εt is a stochastic 
variable subject to the normal distribution with mean μt 
and variance σt2, which are obtained from the historical 
forecast. 
Under an oligopoly market, the players are willing to 
push prices up; hence have the motivation to offer a high 
price with an associated acceptable risk. 
As reported in Fig.3, we suppose the producer will bid 
the price pb and the related acceptance probability is 
p(pt>pb). The bid is determined with a certain acceptable 
confidence p(pt>pb) = α, which depends on the player’s 
attitude to the risk. Therefore the optimal bidding price 
can be formulated as: 
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Fig.3. Market price distribution with price forecast 
result expression 
 The model helps the market players make their biddings 
and provides them a way to control their risks. For the 
player with small market share, usually they are more 
conservative, they may just offer the marginal cost to 
have the maximum possibility to be accepted, accordingly, 
α can be relatively high. For the bigger players, they are 
more powerful in determining the market price hence are 
more likely to accept higher risk, although with this 
approach, the incentive of accepting higher risk remains 
unclear. 
ptF ptF+μt pb
pt>pb 
p
 
 
SVM 
 load  Lt 
day type T  price pt 
hour t 
B. Bidding with surplus forecast 
The goal of the market player defining their bidding 
strategies is to maximize their producer surplus, which 
can be formulated as: 
S = pt *q-C(q) (9) 
where q is the accepted quantity, C is the cost function of 
the producer.  
The offer of the producer may impact the market price. 
This impact is not considered in the previous model and 
in some cases that will significantly influence the 
accuracy of the forecast as well as the definition of the 
bidding strategy. Therefore, the player’s own bid should 
be taken into account as an important input, which is also 
the basis for making the bid. As shown in Fig.4, 
considering all the driving factors, the producer surplus 
can be expressed as: 
S= f(Lt, T, t, pb) (10) 
(10) implies that the complicated formulation of the 
market price pt and the dispatched quantity q are 
implicitly expressed in the surplus function f (Lt, T, t, Pb), 
which can be identified by SVM.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4.Surplus  forecast for players with significant share 
 
On the other hand, from theoretical point of view, 
considering more meaningful inputs that can account for 
the variation of the output, we can forecast the price 
better. For the specific next hour t, since that the short 
term load forecast is with high accuracy, we assume that 
the load Lt is known, hence the surplus function has only 
one decision variable pb , which need to be defined by the 
player. The producer aims to maximize his surplus, which 
is expressed as: 
Max S = f(pb) (11) 
s.t. pbmin ≤pb≤pbmax (12) 
where pbmax and pbmin are respectively the maximum and 
minimum bidding price in the sampling data; the 
sampling data are required to be timely valid, namely the 
latest data are with more weights. Suppose p0 is the 
bidding price corresponding to the maximum surplus with 
reference to (11). The optimal bidding price pbopt can be 
defined as Tab.1. 
When pbmin <p0<pbmax, SVM can map the input(Lt,T,t, pb) 
and output(S) well, the producer can bid pbopt exactly 
equal to p0. 
When p0=pbmin, and sometimes the surplus is zero, it 
means that the player’s bid is possibly the marginal offer. 
To bid lower price may result in more quantity accepted. 
Therefore, pbopt keeps pbmin with probabilityγ1% and there 
will be a β1%pbmax decrease with probability 1-γ1%. 
Higher β2% the player is more conservative in influencing 
the market price.  
when p0=pbmax, the player has the motivation to tentatively 
bid a higher price (1+β2%) pbmax, therefore pbopt keeps 
pbmax with probabilityγ2% and there will be a β2%pbmax 
mark up with probability 1-γ2%. β2% is a parameter 
representing the player’s attitude to the risk. Higher β2% 
implies more confident in determining the market price. 
Tab.1 Definition of pbopt for producer 
p0 pbopt probability 
pbmin γ1% pbmin pbmin(1-β1%) 1-γ1% 
pbmin <p0<pbmax p0 1 
pbmax γ2% pbmax pbmax(1+β2%) 1-γ2% 
 
 
V Numeric examples 
 
The proposed two approaches are applied to a test 
example, in which the load follows the profile of the New 
England market in 2004(Fig.5). It would be difficult to 
invent a specific real market context, because the market 
players may adopt various bidding strategies, and the 
attitude toward the risk and the incomplete information 
will contribute a lot to the variation of the bidding 
strategies. We would like to create a context, in which the 
players bid with reasonable strategies. The capacity, the 
marginal cost and the original parameter α are detailed in 
Tab.2. Highlighting the two approaches and better find 
the impact of the bidding strategy, we define that the 
producers have the same marginal costs. We will study 
the market evolution in 120 days, the first 30 days will be 
the preliminary stage and in the next 90 days the 
producers’ strategic bidding will be examined. 
Because the electricity market is an oligopoly market, the 
market concentration is usually high. The HHI index of 
the market is designed to be 1702.2, which means that it 
is close to a highly concentrated market*. The parameter 
α of each player in the base case is defined with reference 
to his market share, lower market share, the player is less 
confident in making the market price, more conservative 
in bidding, and there will be a higher α corresponded. 
                                                 
* The HHI of a market is calculated by summing the squares of 
the percentage market shares held by the respective firms.  For 
example, an industry consisting of two firms with market shares 
of 70% and 30% has an HHI of 70²+30², or 5800. People regard 
a market, in which HHI is below 1000 as "unconcentrated," 
between 1000 and 1800 as "moderately concentrated," and 
above 1800 as "highly concentrated." 
Producer’s bidding price 
  pbopt 
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Fig. 5 Load profile of the test case, which follows the profile of New England market in 2004 
Tab.2 The data of the companies in the market 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16
MC(€/MWh) 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Quantiy(MWh) 15 15 15 50 45 380 380 60 150 60 51 39 28 32 60 20 
α 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.9 0.95 0.8 0.8 0.95 0.9 0.95 0.9 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.85 0.95
Tab.3 Market simulation under various scenarios 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 Σ 
S1(M€) 0.67 0.70 0.69 2.26 2.10 16.2 16.3 2.79 6.78 2.82 2.36 1.81 1.35 1.44 2.68 0.95 61.8
S2(M€) 1.73 1.69 1.72 5.65 4.92 37.2 35.6 6.41 16.0 6.66 5.88 4.34 3.21 3.52 6.87 2.25 143.7
S3(M€) 1.71 2.50 1.66 5.52 4.97 34.4 37.0 6.57 16.2 6.45 5.49 4.37 3.18 3.56 6.51 2.25 142.5
S4(M€) 1.34 2.44 1.32 4.43 3.97 46.1 27.0 5.34 12.3 5.36 4.49 3.49 2.49 2.87 5.29 1.84 130.1
S5(M€) 0.57 1.38 0.55 1.75 1.66 14.6 34.1 2.31 5.27 2.32 1.88 1.53 1.06 1.19 2.22 0.71 73.06
S6(M€) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.43 0.39 1.02 1.02 0.52 1.01 0.52 0.44 0.34 0.24 0.28 0.52 0.17 7.30
S7(M€) 1.32 1.32 1.32 3.83 3.93 11.2 8.90 5.20 10.1 5.20 3.90 3.41 2.46 2.81 3.39 1.76 69.98
S8(M€) 1.62 1.62 1.62 4.21 4.73 16.5 15.1 6.23 10.2 6.23 4.28 4.13 2.99 3.53 3.12 2.15 88.16
S9(M€) 1.28  1.34  1.34  3.92  3.97  10.0 8.73 5.25 10.5 5.25 3.99 3.45 2.49  2.87  3.42  1.79 69.6 
S10(M€) 1.68 1.68 1.68 4.07 4.73 18.8 17.2 6.12 7.84 6.12 4.14 4.16 3.05 3.67 3.88 2.21 91.05
 
A. Preliminary stage 
Since we want to make use of the forecast, we should 
have the historical data. It is exactly what happened in the 
real market, at beginning, the biddings are tentatively, the 
players are trying to familiar with the market as well as 
their competitors. In this period, we assume that the 
players bid randomly within an interval, which could be 
between the marginal production cost and the price cap, 
which is 200€/MWh in the extreme case. The surpluses of 
each producer may vary drastically. Monte-Carlo method 
will be applied to simulate the bidding of the producers.  
Fig.6 presents market price evolution of the first 5 days, 
the market price is very irregular.  
In Tab.3, S1 is the producer surplus at the preliminary 
stage (the first 30 days). S2 is the producer surplus in the 
next 90 days, but the players still bid randomly, the 
market result is taken as the reference case for the 
following case (sub-section B). The producer surplus are 
basically defined by the quantity, the producer with more 
quantity offered will have more surplus. In this period, the 
producers are getting familiar with the market, preparing 
for the strategic bidding.  
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Fig.6  Market price evolution with randomly bidding at 
the preliminary stage 
B. Bidding with price forecast 
The producers may bid based on the price forecast, they 
can control their risks by adjusting the parameterα. The 
impact of the offering quantity can be assessed as well. 
1) A small producer bids based on price forecast 
After the first 30 days, suppose, there is only one 
producer C2 bid based on the price forecast with α=0.95. 
The surplus is reported in Tab.3 as S3. Obviously, it is 
able to gain much more surplus than the C1(1.71M€) and 
C2(1.66M€). But the market price is almost not 
influenced, and keeps a very irregular profile as well. Fig. 
7 shows the market price between 115th and 120th day. 
The surplus is reported in Tab.3 as S3, the surplus sum of 
all the producers keeps almost unchanged (142.5) from 
the reference case (143.7).  
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Fig.7 Market price evolution with C3strategic bidding 
based on price forecast 
2) one big producer bids based on price forecast 
The producer C6 will bid the price based on the 
forecasted price with the parameter α=0.8. The producer 
surplus is reported in Tab.3 as S4. C6 acquires much more 
surplus (46.1M€) than C7 acquires (27.0M€), although 
they are identical with reference to the marginal cost and 
offering quantity. But the sum of all the producers’ 
surplus is 130.1 M€, which is decreased compared to the 
former scenario (142.5M€); it implies that most of the 
producers suffer from the bidding strategy of C6. If C7 
bids based on price forecast with α=0.95, the 
corresponding producer surplus is S5 in Tab.3. C7 gets 
134% more surplus than C6, it seems higher α=0.95 may 
result in higher surplus. But the sum of the producer 
surplus decreases a lot compare to the previous cases, 
even for C6, it gets less surplus than that in the case the 
producers bid randomly. 
3) all the producers bid based on price forecast 
It seems that for a single producer, it will be benefited 
from the price forecast bidding strategy and higher α will 
help the producer gain more surpluses. We would like to 
study how the market behaves under the scenario with all 
producers taking the price forecast strategy with high 
parameter α equal to 0.98. In Tab3, S6 reports the surplus 
result under this scenario. The sum of producer surplus is 
7.30M€, which is drastically decreased compared to that 
of the reference case (143.7M€). Fig. 8 shows the price 
evolution, we find that after some time, the market price 
goes down until it reaches 30€/MWh, which is exactly the 
marginal cost of all the producers. It implies that a perfect 
competition market is made. 
The small producer can bid with the price forecast model; 
it does not influence too much market result, but can 
significantly improve its own surplus. But for the big 
producer, bidding with price forecast tends to result in 
lowering the market price and makes a perfect 
competition market. 
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Fig.8 Market price evolution with all producers strategic 
bidding based on price forecast with α=0.98 
 
The price forecast bidding strategy does not consider the 
bidding impact, namely with this strategy, the producer is 
not able to know how its bidding will impact the market, 
the major idea is to get its offer accepted by lowering the 
bidding price while the market price is not concerned. 
This may be true with the small producers, but in case that 
the producer is able to significantly influence the market 
price, it may not adopt this strategy, because its surplus 
can be improved even with accepted quantity decreased 
when the market price is increased.  
C. bidding with surplus forecast 
A More effective way is to forecast the surplus directly. 
SVM tries to map the surplus and the input bidding. It 
will be a little difficult to solve the optimization problem 
(11), but as a practical solution, we can compute a certain 
number of S between pbmin and pbmax, inside which the 
mapping should be accurate. It is reasonable, since the 
distance between pbmin and pbmax is not so big, for instance 
50 or 100, we compute 200 S with pb uniformly 
distributed between pbmin and pbmax, that should be enough 
to find the applicable bidding price corresponding to the 
maximum surplus. The study on the surplus forecast 
bidding strategy starts from the scenario with all the 
producers bid with the price forecast bidding strategies, 
which can be a reference case for the following analysis.. 
1) one big producer bids based on surplus forecast 
In this scenario, only C6 bid with the surplus forecast 
bidding strategy. Fig.9 shows the price evolution for the 
last 5 days in the studied time span. The profile is very 
regular and that is more fitting with very much the price 
evolution in the real market; we may infer it is made by 
the big producer C6, who adopt the strategies that are able 
to keep the market evolve with a certain regular profile 
with reference to the load profile. Fig. 13 shows that the 
daily average market price in last 15days marks up a lot 
from that of the reference case, in which the market price 
is the marginal cost 30 €/MWh. The strategic bidding of 
the big producer C6 may account for this price increase. 
The bids of C6 serve as the marginal units and determine 
the market prices. S7 in Tab.3 is the related surplus results. 
All the producers are benefited form the strategic bidding 
of C6 with reference to S6, with which, the producers 
follow the price forecast bidding strategy. Compared to 
the case that all the producers bid according to price 
forecast, the surplus of each the producer increased a lot. 
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Fig.9 Market price evolution with C6 strategic bidding 
based on surplus forecast with the parameterβ1=5%, 
β2=5%,γ1=80%,γ2=80% (115th-120th day) 
2) Two big producer bid based on surplus forecast  
Besides the producer C6, C7 also takes the bidding 
strategy based on surplus forecast. The regular price 
evolution is shown in Fig. 10. The average daily price of 
the last 15 days is increased compared to previous 
scenario as shown in Fig. 13. The result surplus is 
reported as S8 in Tab.3. The producer surplus of C7 
increases from 8.90 M€ to 15.1 M€ with reference to the 
previous scenario, moreover, the surplus is significantly 
increased for each producer. It means that as a big 
producer, it would be good to bid with the surplus 
forecast approach, which makes its own surplus higher as 
well as the producer surplus of the other producers. 
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Fig.10 Market price evolution with both C6 and C7 
bidding based on surplus forecast with β1=5%, 
β2=5%,γ1=80%,γ2=80%(115th-120th day) 
3) One big producer and one small producer bid based 
on surplus forecast 
Besides the producer C6, the small producer C1 also bid 
with the surplus forecast. The surplus is reported in Tab.3 
as S9. The surplus sum of S9  keeps almost unchanged 
with reference to S7. As shown in Fig. 13, the unchanging 
of the price is also reflected by the average daily price in 
the last 15 days with reference to that in the scenario with 
only C6 bidding with surplus forecast. But the surplus of 
C1 is less than that of S7, which is the result of only C6 
strategically bids based on surplus forecast. It means that 
C1 cannot improve its surplus by adopting the bidding 
strategy based on surplus forecast; the surplus of C1 may 
even worse. Fig.11 presents the market price evolution 
between 115th and 120th day under this scenario. 
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Fig.11 Market price evolution with C1 C6 bidding based 
on surplus forecast with the parameterβ1=5%, 
β2=5%,γ1=80%,γ2=80%(115th-120th day) 
4) three producers bid based on surplus forecast 
All the three big producers (C6, C7, C9) bid based on 
maximizing their surpluses. Fig.12 shows the regular 
price evolution for the last 5 days in the studied time span. 
The producer surpluses are increased as S9 reported in 
Tab.3. Moreover, in this scenario, the surpluses of the 
producers other than the C6, C7, C9 gets almost the same 
surplus as what they can get in the randomly bidding 
scenario (S2). The decrease of the surplus sum (from 
143.7 M€ to 91.05 M€) is mainly contributed by the loss 
of three biggest producers.  
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Fig.12 Market price evolution with C6, C7 and C9 
bidding based on surplus forecast with β1=5%, 
β2=5%,γ1=80%,γ2=80%(115th-120th day) 
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Fig. 13 Daily average price of the last 15 days in various 
scenarios (106th – 120th day) 
VI Conclusion 
 
The electricity market players cannot have complete 
information, which makes it difficult to define the bidding 
strategy by accurately computing the market equilibrium. 
The bidding strategy proposed in this paper is based on 
forecast technology, which fully makes use of the easily 
acquired information of the market.  
General speaking the price forecast bidding strategy 
proposed in this paper is a conservative approach; it can 
be applied by the small producers, which does not aim to 
increase the market price but to guarantee the acceptance 
of their offering. In case that the market price is not 
influenced, this approach can improve their surplus 
efficiently. It should not be applied by the big producers, 
since with this approach, their offers may drastically 
lower the market price and result in surplus loss. 
Besides the price forecast bidding strategy for the small 
producers, we extended the SVM technology to the 
surplus forecast for the price maker, who owns a 
significant market share. The players dynamically learn 
from the market and bid based on the latest acquired 
information. The variation of the market behavior will be 
soon perceived and reacted by the proposed bidding 
strategy. The market share distribution can be effectively 
reflected by the price evolution. The big producers can get 
extra surplus by adopting the surplus forecast bidding 
strategy, but that does not apply to the small producers. 
The surplus forecast approach takes into account both the 
effects of the price and quantity acceptance, it is suitable 
for the big producer to evaluate the comprehensive 
outcome. But it is hard for a small producer to define the 
market price; therefore the price mark up mechanism in 
surplus forecast approach does not help the small 
producer gain extra surplus but increase its risk of offer 
rejection.  
For a specific producer, it is able to make decisions either 
by surplus forecast approach or by price forecast 
approach with various parameters definition, which is 
able to reflect the producers’ attitude to the risk.  
Moreover, small producers bid with price forecast and the 
big producers bid with surplus forecast producer regular 
price profile, which fits the real market very much. By 
adjusting the parameters, the proposed approaches are 
promising for the real electricity market simulation. 
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